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Abstract
Most web sites provide display advertising and contextual advertising services
simultaneously, which are the main ad formats in Internet. With multimedia format, the
pricing of display ads is generally based on the occurrence of ad impressions. However,
targeting their customers more accurately, contextual ads are performance based
advertisements and are charged only if one visitor clicks a client’s appointed ad. In this
paper, we develop an economic model to examine the pricing strategy, profitability, and
social efficiency of these two heterogeneous web advertising channels, with respect to
different market structures.
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Introduction
The role of advertising is to deliver the message of individual products to consumers
(Soberman 2004). Firms pursue higher exposure for products because it impresses more of
the potential market; thus, motivates consumers to purchase the products. According to
“Internet Advertising Revenue Report” announced by IAB in 2006 April, Internet ad revenue
in the United States amounted over $12.5 billion for the full year 2005, up from $9.6 billon
reported in 2004. The increasing number suggests that Internet is one of most fundamental
brand-building components in marketing channels. The Internet ad formats can be divided
into search, display-related advertising, and classifieds based on revenues ranked from high
to low, accounting for more than 90 percent of revenues during these two years
(http://www.iab.net/resources/ad_revenue.asp). Besides playing the role of content providers
attracting different types of users, web sites may carry multimedia advertising to offer clients
more ways to reach their target audience and specific marketing objectives.
Traditional ad pricing strategy used in newspaper, radio, and television is based on cost per
thousand, abbreviated as CPT, which means the cost for showing the ad to one thousand
viewers. Web sites may guarantee an advertiser the lowest number of impressions, an
ambiguous term stamped on everyone’s mind; however, nobody can show whether it is worth
the price to pay for the number of times that web ads are seen by visitors. This question stems
from the theatrical difference between pushing and pulling. Unlike traditional media pushing
messages to individuals alternately in everyday life, people are active in Internet and pull
information through this new medium, which means that audience have ability to read
preferred content and avert their eyes from ad trap set by advertisers (Schwartz 1997).
Consequently, click-thru rate (CTR), derived from dividing the number of visitors who
clicked on an ad embedded in a web page by the number of times that the web page was
delivered, becomes an index for measuring the performance of advertisement. For example,
Procter & Gamble, one of biggest advertisers in American, was the first company to contract
with Yahoo to pay ad fee grounded on CTR in 1996. Since click behavior is useful to
demonstrate online advertising effectiveness, the first attempt for modeling such effects over
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a relatively short period of time had been proposed by Chatterjee et al., which highlights the
importance of explicit consumer identification procedures to enhance the value of clickstream
data (Chatterjee et al. 2003).
Therefore, a new ad pricing mechanism plus contextual advertising has turned into the focus
of attention because of a highly cost-effective feature. The rule is simple: clients set their bid
for each placement on sections or specific pages and only pay for a qualified click when a
visitor clicks on their ads. In other words, clients can pay for performance and find their most
valuable targets interested in a specific type of content web sites offer. For each web page
such program often represents three to five different ads in a frame, each including title,
description, and display URL, whose size often corresponds to a large rectangle affording to
place an independent display ad. The order of placement is determined by specific rules
based on a combination of factors, such as relevancy, bid amount, click-thru rate, and so on.
Therefore, customers have no ability to know when their ads appear on appointed web pages,
but know that the chance of exposure is influenced by these factors. Consequently, if time
pressure caused by these factors is low or moderate, this seems a reasonable and economic
way for advertisers to control their budget and implement their marketing plan in Internet.
Because the expense to establish and maintain an online auction-based and pay-per-click
platform is respectable, most web sites cooperate with other firms which concentrate on
search techniques to reduce their cost and take their profits from each page in pre-agreed
proportions. The web sites just copy and paste a block of JavaScript codes to their web page
and then content-related ads start working without maintaining advertiser relationships.
Literature Review
The effect advertising is mainly determined by ad expenditure level, time in market, number
of competitors, and order of entry (Vakratsas et al. 2004). To expand the entire market and
win market share, Bass et al. (2005) define advertising as “generic advertising” and “brand
advertising” according to the effect of advertising, respectively. Their results suggest that
generic and brand advertising must be properly coordinated for preventing suboptimal
allocation of advertising budget. Jedidi et al. (1999) measure the effects of changes in
advertising and promotion policies on sales and profits, suggesting that advertising has a
positive effect on “brand equity” in the long term. Prior research suggests developing one
common Web advertisement for all users may not be the most effective way to drive intended
visitors to a certain web site (Korgaonkar and Wolin 2002). One of the fundamental questions
that marketers face in advertisement is how to implement target advertising to specific
consumers and how to allocate their media budgets (Iyer et al. 2005). In the recent studies,
Kim et al. (2001) use tree induction techniques and data-mining tools to generate marketing
rules that match customer demographics, providing personalized advertisement selection
when a customer visits an Internet store.
Model
We consider an ad pricing problem where clients (ads sponsors) want to publish their
advertising on web sites through two different channels: display advertising channel or
contextual advertising channel. A purchase action is executed by a client and each client
buys an ad, which could be either advertising executed in the display ads channel or
contextual ads channel. Thus, we denote the total ads purchase amount during a certain time
interval in this market is 0 . Also, we divide 0 into d and s , which represent the purchase
amount with respect to display advertising and contextual advertising, respectively. The
advertising fees of display advertising are charged on an impression basis; that is, no matter
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whether a visitor clicks client’s ad, the system charges dp for impression as long as the web
page containing client’s ad is delivered to visitor’s browser. On the contrary, the advertising
fees of contextual advertising are charged on a click basis; that is, no matter whether a visitor
views client’s ad, the system can’t charge any fee until someone clicks clients’ ads. The price
of one click is denoted as sp . Notice that though both display and contextual ads could be
delivered in the same website, these two heterogeneous advertising platforms may be
operated a single (monopolistic) web advertising channel firm or two competitive firms.
There are two main types of effect (benefit) caused by web ads: impression benefit and click
benefit. Impression benefit catches the value of impressing the visitors about the advertised
products or the firm, even without any further business transactions. However, click benefit
mainly considers the value developed when visitors click a specific ad to an appointed web
site. Thus, click benefit is measured based on revenue generating from further business
transactions, whereas impression benefit is associated with value from brand building.
Display advertising is presented in multimedia format, whereas contextual advertising are
presented as text only. Thus, display ads delivery better performance in delivering the
impression benefit. We assume, the impression effect is heterogeneous to different clients;
therefore, we let the impact factor of impression effect i of the clients be uniformly
distributed within a unit interval. A client iwith higher i has higher intention to build brand
loyalty. We denote d ( d ) and s ( s )as impression benefit (click thru rate) with respect to
display advertising and contextual advertising, respectively. Also, we denote the value from
the outcome of a click as  . Therefore, each client choosing display advertising can receive
benefit from an impression; however, the expected benefit of clicking effect she receives
is d because the probability of a click event occurring in display advertising channel is d .
Similarly, each client choosing contextual advertising can receive benefit from an ad click;
however, the expected benefit of branding effect she receives is s s  because her ad might
had been delivered several times before her ads is clicked by someone.
Furthermore, because of the limited capacity of the advertising platform, we should consider
queuing effect. As the advertising platform is shared by all the subscribed ads, ad sponsors
must wait until the ad activity is committed (e.g. an impression for display advertising and a
click for contextual advertising). The cost of average waiting time of display advertising and
contextual advertising are denoted as d dw  and s sw , respectively. The waiting time increases
as the number of clients in channels ( d and s ). An advertising supplier who provides
display advertising platform can reduce waiting time by aggregating more web sites to obtain
sufficient traffic volume ( dw becomes smaller). Similarly, the waiting time of contextual
advertising can also be reduced by high traffic volume; moreover, the accuracy of search
results will help “consume” clients’ ads ( sw becomes smaller). In other words, the quality of
search engine is also a key factor to reduce time cost for clients in contextual advertising
channel. Thus, the payoff of a typical client i is given by
( )
display ads (an impression)
contexual ads (a click)
d d i d d d
i
s s i s s s
w p
w p
   







Since multimedia appeals to a variety of visitors than text does, it is natural that
d s > should be a common perspective. For the purpose of exposition, we assume s as
zero; thus, d can be interpreted as the comparative impression benefit from ads with
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multimedia display. The payoff of a typical client i is rewritten as
display ads (an impression)
contexual ads (a click)











Besides, we assume impression and click effects are sufficiently high ( 0d sw  > > ) such
that each client will purchase an ad no matter which ad type she purchase. Since each client
chooses a preferable ad service from display advertising and contextual advertising, the
market-segmentation condition is given by
ˆ
d d d d d s s sw p w p     +   =   ,
where the payoff a client with type̂ receives is indifferent between these two ad services.
( ) ( ) ( )1ˆ d d s d d s s
d
p p w w   


 +  + 
= . (3.3)
All clients indexed by ˆ0,i    choose contextual advertising and the other clients indexed
by ˆ,1i     prefer display advertising. Furthermore,̂ reveals that display advertising can
increase its market share by making a strong impression on visitors or enhancing click thru
rate; likewise, contextual advertising can increase its market share by enhancing the quality
of search engine so as to reduce waiting time as well as raise click thru rate. In other words,
contextual advertising will occupy the prevailing position if search engine can match ads to
the content of web sites precisely. Consequently, according to
conditions 0
ˆ
s  = and 0 s d  = + , the demand functions of multimedia advertising and
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Pricing in the Web Advertisement Markets
We first examine the pricing strategy of a monopolized advertising channel firm which
provides display advertising and contextual advertising simultaneously, or offer a pure ad
service. Subsequently, we consider the case that in this market there exist two leader
advertising firms which own different competitive advantage. For example, Quigo is a well-
known web advertising firm, concentrating on content-targeted product. On the contrary, e-
marcom is an innovative marketing company that provides interactive multimedia advertising
to help their customers increase sales and improve branding effectiveness.
Monopolized Advertising Firm in the Market
Since fixed cost is irrelevant to firm’s final decision on postal prices, we only consider
marginal cost of display advertising and contextual advertising, denoted as dc and sc ; thus, the
profit-maximization problem of monopolized ad firm is given by
( ) ( )
,m md s
m m m m m
d d d s s s
p p
Max p c p c  =  +  (4.1)
The marginal cost of display advertising is dominated by multimedia design cost and higher
transmission cost due to larger file size. On the contrary, the marginal cost of contextual
advertising is slight because text-only format can saves designing cost and reduce traffic;
here, with the loss of generality, we assume sc as zero to simplify the profit-maximization
problem. Since both the demand functions of display advertising and contextual advertising
are associated with the relative price of these two services m md sp p p =  , instead of solving
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the first order condition with respect to mdp and
m
sp , we rewrite the objective function as




1 1 (4.2)m m m




p p c w p p w p
w w
Max       
 
= +   +     + +  + 
+ +
It can be easily observed that the joint profit is linearly increasing with msp , and
m is concave
on p . Solving first order condition 0m p  = , we find the optimal price
offset ( )( )0 1 2
m
d s d dp w c    = +   + . Then, the unit price of contextual advertising
should be as high as possible such that the profit is maximized. It can be set to be a value
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Obviously, providing hybrid advertising in web site is always better than either pure display
advertising or contextual advertising platform as a pure advertising approach becomes a
special case of a hybrid approach in which one of service is closed.
Proposition 1 (AMonopolistic Web Advertisement Market)
(a) Contextual ads channel is always offered, while display ads channel is offered when click
through rate is sufficiently large such that ( )0ˆ 1 /d d d s dw c    > =  +  .
(b) The price of the display ads (an impression) is greater than the price of the contextual ads
(a click) if display ads channel is offered. In addition, the demand of contextual ads is higher
than that of display ads. Formally, 0mp > and m md s < .
Dual Advertising Firms in the Market
Let us consider a simultaneous price competition between multimedia advertising and
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From first order conditions, 0c cd dp  = and 0
c c
s sp  = , we derive the price response
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= . (4.5)
Solving both equations simultaneously, we have Nash equilibrium,
( )0 02 2 1 2
3




    + +   +
= ,
( )0 02 1
3
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= . (4.6)
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d s d d s d
w w c w w c
w w w w
         
 
   
+ +    + + +  +
= =
+ + + +
, (4.7)
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We have
( ) ( )0 2 1
3




   +    +
 =  = .
Proposition 2 (A Duopolistic Web Advertisement Market)
(a) The higher the click thru rate of display advertising, d , the more (less) expensive the
display advertising (contextual advertising). Formally, / 0cd dp   > , and / 0
c
s dp   < .
(b) Both prices of display and contextual ads increase as the cost of design a display ad dc ,
the impression effect of display ads d , the market size 0 , but decrease with the traffic of
the website (smaller dw ) and the accuracy of contextual search engine (smaller dw ).
(c) The price heterogeneity of display ads and contextual ads is smaller. Formally,
c mp p <  .
(d) The demand of contextual ads (display ads) is lower (higher) in a competitive market.
Formally, c ms s < and
c m
d d > .
Analysis of Economic Efficiency
In this section we consider a socially planned market in which both display advertising and
contextual advertising are offered. Subsequently, we compare socially optimal results with
resource allocation in the monopolistic market and competitive market. The efficiency of
approach allocation is measured by its social welfare, which is all sum of clients’ payoffs and
the advertising channel providers. In the following, we first investigate the characteristics of
an efficient (or social welfare maximizing) channel allocation, which is social planner’s








=  + + . Thus, the socially optimal choices can be found by solving
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Thus, it would be social optimal if the relative price of these two services satisfies




d d d s d d s d dw w w
d s
d s d
w w w c w w
p p p
w w
    
 
+ + +  + 
 =  =
+ +
. (5.3)
Proposition 3 (Efficient Market)
If the market size is sufficient large or the marginal cost of display ads is sufficient small,
then the allocation of contextual ads in a socially planned market is lower than that in a
monopolized market.
Conclusion
Display advertising and contextual advertising are two important vehicles for delivering web
advertisement to visitors. In this paper, we have developed an economic model to study the
competence between multimedia advertising and contextual advertising in either
monopolistic or duopolistic market. In a competitive market contextual advertising turns into
a powerful weapon to make respectable revenue for firms concentrating on search technique,
threatening the position of traditional multimedia advertising. Moreover, the equilibrium
pricing decisions and resulting demand distributions are significantly associated with the
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market power of the firm if these two approaches are operated by independent firms. Our
analytical results show that it will be efficient to allocate users appropriately according to the
relation among click thru rate, click utility and impression utility, in the absence of any
pricing scheme. Socially optimal results suggest that a social planner should set catch price to
motivate more clients use contextual advertising when the total market size is sufficient large.
In our model we assume that web sites allot the same advertisement space to these two ad
platforms. In fact, most web sites often allocate more contextual advertising than multimedia
advertising under the same space. Thus, investigating the corresponding pricing strategies
under different ad space is a planned future extension. Furthermore, we also assume that the
click thru rate of contextual advertising is larger than that of multimedia advertising.
However, there seems to be no direct evidence to support this viewpoint. Thus, we may relax
this setting to discover more interesting insights in the future study. On the other hand, if each
client bids based on her budget and individual valuation, this question will be classified into
Vickrey auction; thus, it is an interesting topic to study market share in the environment
where the exposure rate of ads is also determined by bid value.
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